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Plural Policing and the challenge of democratic accountability 
 
Stuart Lister and Trevor Jones1 
 
Democratic accountability is a key concept in thinking and writing about Western political 
systems. The normative prescription that those in positions of power should be obliged to 
justify their use of power within a political forum that may lead to sanction is widely seen to 
be an intrinsic characteristic of µGHPRFUDWLF JRYHUQDQFH¶ (Bovens, 2005). As policing concerns 
the institutionalized use of authority in tKHWDVNRIµJRYHUQLQJVHFXULW\¶Johnston and 
Shearing, 2003), so ± in turn ± it requires governing in ways that hold those responsible 
accountable to democratic bodies. Accordingly, a key focus of policing debates has been on 
the institutional arrangements established for ensuring its structures of governance are 
democratically accountable. To date, however, research on WKHµGHPRFUDWLF¶RUµSROLWLFDO¶
accountability of policing has focused almost exclusively upon public police organisations 
(see for example, Lustgarten, 1986; Reiner, 1993; Reiner, 1995; Jones and Newburn, 1997; 
Walker, 2000). Relatively few authors have discussed private and other plural forms of 
µpolicing beyond the state¶ when reviewing options for establishing democratically 
accountable policing (though see Loader 2000; Crawford et al., 2005; Sarre and Prenzler, 
2005; Stenning, 2009). This tendency to restrict discussions to state-centric analyses of the 
QDWXUHRISRZHUDQGDXWKRULW\UHIOHFWVDEURDGHUµP\RSLD¶LQSROLFLQJVFKRODUVKLSShearing, 
2006; Stenning, 2009). It appears, for instance, to be increasingly anomalous in light of recent 
empirical studies tracing the growing role of non-governmental, frequently commercial (or so-
FDOOHGµIRU-SURILW¶, agencies in the authorisation and provision of policing (see e.g. Jones and 
Newburn, 1998; Noaks, 2000; Wakefield, 2003; Crawford et al., 2005).  
 In the light of this µP\RSLD¶, this chapter seeks to substantially broaden debates about 
accountability and policing. It does so by analysing the extent to which the mixed economy of 
public and private policing can be governed according to, and accommodated within, 
democratic principles (cf. Stenning, 2009). These principles, we suggest, offer a set of criteria 
for thinking about the challenges of governing plural policing networks in ways that are 
democratically accountable, and which, in turn, promote the idea of policing as a public good. 
This, we assert, is crucial because policing is a normative enterprise that holds significant 
implications not only for principles of human rights, due process, and fair treatment 
(Crawford, 2007), but also for utilitarian objectives of ensuring that citizens live in just and 
safe societies. A key challenge, however, is presented by the role of the market in determining 
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the extent to which policing is distributed and delivered equitably and effectively. In pursuing 
our argument, we query the extent to which market forces and free competition, even when 
seemingly functioning well, will serve to govern policing in ways that ensures its allocation 
and delivery accord with democratic values (cf. Trebilcock and Iacobucci, 2003).  
 2XUOLQHRIHQTXLU\IRFXVHVRQµORFDOVHFXULW\QHWZRUNV¶'XSRQWLQ(QJODQG
and Wales, the remit of which usually extends both to crime and disorder reduction, inclusive 
of the protection of public and private assets. These multi-organisational networks are 
constitutive of broader shifts in how power and authority are contemporaneously arranged, 
exercised and governed in late-modern sociHWLHV7KHVWDWLVWµFRPPDQGDQGFRQWURO¶PRGHORI
µgovernment¶ LVVDLGWRKDYHJLYHQZD\WRDPRUHµQHWZRUNHGJRYHUQDQFH¶ model, in which 
authority is not dominated by a single locus but exercised through dispersed, less hierarchical 
and a more pluralistiFRUµQRGDO¶set of institutional formations (Rose and Miller, 1992; 
Rhodes, 1997; Rose, 2000; Moran, 2001). In this context, governmentality theorists have 
highlighted how neo-liberal governmental reforms have VHSDUDWHGWKHµVWHHULQJ¶IXQFWLRQVRI
governance from the µURZLQJ¶IXQFWLRQVWUDQVIRUPLQJthe role of the state to that of a regulator 
or facilitator of the governing activities of others (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). In turn, 
governance and accountability relations have themselves become increasingly diversified and 
pluralistic (Mulgan, 1997; Baberis, 1998). As a consequence, the act of governing is no longer 
contingent on vertical chains of accountability that link providers of public services with 
institutional structures of the democratic polity. The rise of security networks comprising state, 
civil society and market actors, whose governance and accountability structures frequently 
stand outside of extant political structures, raises specific challenges if they are to be governed 
not only effectively but also democratically. 
 The chapter is divided into the following sections. The first outlines the recent growth 
of plural policing, identifying the conceptual implications that arise from this empirical 
development. The second contextualises the regulatory challenge of plural policing, before 
critiquing recent legal and policy responses. The third assesses plural policing against a set of 
democratic criteria, drawing attention to the governance and accountability challenges of 
prioritizing these democratic credentials. The fourth emphasises the need for a holistic 
approach to the governance of plural policing networks, and considers how this might be 
secured in ways that are democratically accountable. 
 
The re-emergence of plural policing 
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Over the last four decades there has been a substantial growth of scholarly interest in the 
pluralization of policing. A widespread process of restructuring has seen policing become 
increasingly fragmented, multi-tiered and dispersed, resulting in the proliferation of forms of 
policing ERWKµZLWKLQ¶DQGµEH\RQG¶JRYHUQPHQW(Bayley and Shearing, 1996, 2001). Indeed, 
the very idea of the police as monopolistic guardians of law and order has dissolved in the face 
of neo-liberal traits of governing that have stimulated twin-processes of pluralization and 
marketization of policing (Johnston, 2007). Much of the academic interest has focused on the 
so-FDOOHGµUH-ELUWK¶ of µSULYDWHSROLFLQJ¶ZLWKLQWKHODWH-modern era (Johnston, 1992; Button, 
2002; Van Steden, 2007), and particularly the commercial activities of the private security 
industry. The rise, for example, of private security guards has attracted much attention (see 
Rigakos, 2002; Wakefield, 2003; Button, 2007), generating debates inter alia of the 
similarities and differences between µSXEOLFSROLFH¶DQGµSULYDWHVHFXULW\¶, particularly with 
regard to the interests each serves, their organisational forms as well as their mentalities, 
techniques and practices (Shearing, and Stenning, 1983; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Wood 
and Shearing, 2007). 
 The post-war development of the private security industry has been famously described 
by Stenning and Shearing (1980) as DµTXLHWUHYROXWLRQ¶LQSROLFLQJ. Research has revealed 
how a burgeoning global private security industry undertakes a wide array of policing 
activities (Stenning, 2000; Johnston, 2007; Van Stedden, 2007), including the core police 
functions of law enforcement, order maintenance and crime investigation. Although problems 
of estimation mean that all figures have to be treated with caution, there is a consensus that the 
private security industry in England and Wales has expanded considerably in recent years and 
now employs significantly more people than the VWDWH¶VSXEOLFSROLFHIRUFHV (Jones and Lister, 
2015). The growth of the industry has been fuelled by increasing demands for protective 
services across a range of economic and social contexts. Although much of the initial 
discussion about private security linkHGLWVH[SDQVLRQWRWKHJURZWKRIµPDVVSULYDWHSURSHUW\¶
(Shearing and Stenning, 1981, 1983) such as shopping centres, holiday complexes, retail 
parks, educational campuses, leisure parks, its presence is now increasing in more openly 
accessible, public places, such as residential areas and town centres (Crawford, 2011). 
$FFRUGLQJO\WKHRUWKRGR[\WKDWSULYDWHVHFXULW\VKRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGWKHµMXQLRUSDUWQHU¶WR
the public police has become increasingly challenged. Many citizens therefore now live, work, 
shop and spend their leisure time in places where they are more likely to encounter private 
security guards rather public police officers. As a consequence, the nature of the social order 
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that private actors are tasked with constructing, and the styles of policing they subsequently 
deliver, bear significant implications for notions of citizenship (Shearing and Stenning, 1981). 
 The growth of private security, however, is but one focus of the broadening analytical 
lens through which developments in local policing must be viewed. Over the last two decades 
we have seen we has seen diversification and pluralization across a range of state and non-
state actors delivering visible and organised forms of security-orientated patrols. The 
emergence of this mixed economy has been stimulated not only E\FLWL]HQV¶GHPDQGVIRU order 
and security, but also by a series of governmental initiatives that have encouraged local 
DXWKRULWLHVVRFLDOKRXVLQJSURYLGHUVSULYDWHEXVLQHVVHVYROXQWDU\VHFWRUDQGUHVLGHQWV¶JURXSV
to take greater responsibility for their own policing needs (Lister, 2007). The interlinked 
µFRPPXQLW\VDIHW\¶DQGµDQWL-VRFLDOEHKDYLRXU¶DJHQGDVLQWKHODWWHUSDUWRIWKHVIRU
H[DPSOHIXHOOHGWKHJURZWKRIµPXQLFLSDOSDWUROV¶VXFKDVµQHLJKERXUKRRGZDUGHQV¶µVWUHHW
ZDUGHQV¶DQGµFLW\FHQWUHDPEDVVDGRUV¶&rawford et al., 2005). Broadly aimed at improving 
the social and economic well-being of public spaces, these new public auxiliaries were 
designed to contribute to local systems of social control by introducing an additional layer of 
intermediary personnel within civil society (Crawford and Lister, 2004a). By 2003 it was 
estimated that almost 500 warden schemes were in operation in England and Wales (NACRO, 
2003), although the number has subsequently declined as a result of the loss of ring-fenced 
central government funding and the arrival of a new police patrol auxiliary in the form of 
µSROLFHFRPPXQLW\VXSSRUWRIILFHUV¶3&62V 
 Established by the Police Reform Act of 2002, PCSOs to provide a greater visible 
police presence on the streets represented further degree of pluralization RIµSROLFLQJE\
JRYHUQPHQW¶/RDGHUPCSOs are µFLYLOLDQ¶RIILFHUVGLUHFWHGDQGFRQWUROOHGE\WKH
Chief Constable, but undergo less training and have fewer legal powers than professional 
police officers. With a core remit to reassure the public and reduce anti-social behaviour, 
PCSOs represent the visible face of the community safety agenda. There are now just over 
13,500 PCSOs in England and Wales undertaking a wide range of front-line policing duties. 
As they are cheaper to recruit and deploy then police officers and lend themselves to more 
stable assignments, PCSOs have enabled the police to assert a degree of control over the patrol 
function by competing more effectively with other (non-police) providers in local markets for 
patrol (see Blair, 2003). Local authorities, along with other social housing providers and 
private businesses, have increasingly entered into contractual agreements with police forces to 
fund the localised provision of PCSOs. Consequently the introduction of PCSOs has been 
interpreted not only as a governmental attempt to ensure the police retained greater control 
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over the patrol function, but also as DµPRQRSROLVWLF¶state approach to integrating the activities 
of plural policing within the police organisation (Crawford, 2008). 
 2YHUWKHVDPHSHULRGZHKDYHDOVRVHHQIXUWKHUµpluralization EHORZWKHVWDWH¶LQWKH
form of order-definition and maintenance, rule-making and regulation exercised by non-
commercial, community and voluntary organizations (Lea and Stenson, 2007). Part of this has 
DULVHQIURPQHZGHYHORSPHQWVLQWKHµUHVSRQVLELOL]DWLRQ¶RIQRQ-state organizations to take 
control of their own security, and the spreading language of partnership, co-production and 
community self-governance (Garland, 2001; Wood and Shearing, 2007). Although it is 
difficult to assess claims about changes in policing µIURPEHORZ¶LQWKHDEVHQFHRIUHOLDEOH
longitudinal data, Bayley and Shearing (1996) have suggestHGWKDWµFLWL]HQ-OHG¶SROLFLQJ
expanded in many countries in the latter part of the 20th Century. Indeed, although in England 
and Wales µFLWL]HQ-OHG¶SDWUROVsuch as RUJDQL]HGUHVLGHQWV¶JURXSVFULPHSUHYHQWLRQ
associations and faith-based organizations, have not been extensively researched, they do 
appear to have increased recently both in diversity, scale and degree of organization 
(Crawford, 2008; Jones and Lister, 2015). 6XIILFHWRVD\WKHDFWLYLWLHVRIWKHVHµFLWL]HQ-OHG¶
DQGµWKLUGVHFWRU¶JURXSVDGGIXUWKHUFRPSOH[LW\WRWKHlocalised division of labour between 
public, private and hybrid policing actors (Johnston, 1992). 
 These developments signify that it has become increasingly acceptable for 
organisations other than central government to assert a degree of control over their own 
security needs, often by purchasing policing services on the open market. Policing has become 
not only pluralized but also increasingly marketized, commercially arranged and governed by 
market-based and privately contracted forms of accountability. The separation of those 
authorising from those delivering policing reflects the growth of purchaser/provider splits in 
its arrangement and provision (Bayley and Shearing, 1996). Subsequently, public bodies have 
become major purchasers of policing services from both the public and private sectors; 
equally, private sector, commercial organisations routinely purchase policing services from the 
VWDWH¶VSXEOLF police forces. The complexity of these de-centralized and multi-lateral 
arrangements demonstrates their µK\EULG¶character, in which conceptually and empirically 
they straddle the traditional public/private divide (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Dupont, 2004). 
There is no neat compartmentalisation of public and private policing resources deployed to 
µSXEOLF¶RUµSULYDWH¶VSDFHV, for instance (Stenning, 2009). Rather, the mounting spatial 
complexity of urban life is stimulating increasingly complex policing arrangements. Privately 
funded policing though predominantly found on private property or land, is not restricted in 
this way. The growth of commercial areas leased to and managed by private sector landlords 
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in many British towns and cities, for instance, has seen an increase in private security guards 
patrolling public spaces (Crawford, 2011; Jones and Lister, 2015). Likewise, privately 
purchased µpublic¶ police officers can also be found operating within spaces owned or 
temporarily managed by private corporations, such as leisure festival venues or sports stadia. 
$VDFRQVHTXHQFHWKHQDWXUHRIZKDWLVµSXEOLF¶DQGZKDWLVµSULYDWH¶KDVLtself become 
increasingly conceptually contested. 
 Such conceptual and empirical developments have significant implications for how we 
might understand the character of contemporary policing, as well as how it might be 
democratically governed. As alluded to above, the growing diversity and heterogeneity of 
policing providers has rendered the idea of hierarchical formulations of power increasingly 
redundant such that the state is but one (albeit important) node within a broader network of 
SROLFLQJRUµsecurity governance¶PRUHEURDGO\GHILQHG (Johnston and Shearing, 2003). 
Rhetorically referred to within policy discRXUVHVDVWKHµH[WHQGHGSROLFLQJ IDPLO\¶+RPH
Office, 2001), the emergence of these multi-organisational, security networks raises acute 
questions of coordination, oversight and effectiveness. Harnessing the diverse efforts of the 
assemblage of local providers KDVIRUHJURXQGHGµSDUWQHUVKLS¶DSSURDFKHV to policing and 
community safety, which seek to integrate the breadth of activities and increase the 
functionality and effectiveness of the network as a whole. Whilst of itself this ambition raises 
considerable challenges, these arguably pale in comparison to the challenges of subjecting 
networked RUµQRGDOpolicing¶ to democratic governance. It is in consideration of this 
regulatory challenge to which the remainder of this chapter now turns. 
 
Regulating plural policing  
 
Given the prevalence of plural orders of policing in contemporary systems of social control, it 
is important to develop ways of connecting them to democratic structures of governance. As 
Loader (2000: 324) suggestsµWKHTXHVWLRQV«WKDWKDYHORQJYH[HGGLVFXVVLRQVRISROLFH
policy and (mal)practice in liberal democratic societies press themselves with renewed force 
under the altered coQGLWLRQVRISOXUDOSROLFLQJ¶ Yet, if the contested nature of police 
µJRYHUQDQFH¶DQGµDFFRXQWDELOLW\¶relations gives rise to complex and daunting challenges, 
they become even more so when considering the complex µSROLFLQJZHE¶%URGHXU, 2010) of 
public and private agencies and actors. Where police ± at both the individual and institutional 
level ± in England and Wales are rendered accountable through a series of principal-agent 
relationship chains that link them to elected political structures, offering a symbolic as well as 
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a functional element of democratic responsibility for, and control over, local policing, there is 
no equivalent apex of authority governing plural policing networks. Rather, the emergence of 
a pluralized and marketized landscape of policing has given rise to a more diversified set of 
horizontal accountability relations, undermining reliance on vertical chains of political 
accountability that have traditionally characterised accountability relations within more 
monopolistic, state-based formations of policing (Bovens, 2005).  
 The shift towards market-based allocations of policing, therefore, raises acute 
regulatory challenges if the activities of autonomous private providers are to be aligned with 
public values and democratic principles (Greve, 2008). The form of contractual governance 
within market arrangements is highly individualised and distinct from the wider modes of 
responsiveness to democratic bodies envisaged in idealised notions of local police 
accountability. It tends to be a narrow style of managerial accountability, related to costs and 
outputs, rather than deeper questions of resource allocation, priorities and policing styles. 
Moreover, as Shearing and Stenning (1983) famously asserted, commercially-arranged 
SROLFLQJKDVDµclient-GHILQHG¶PDQGDWH,WLVoverwhelmingly instrumental in purpose, 
designed to serve the exclusive, and often elitist, interests of those who pay for its provision.  
It therefore risks sidelining the interests of non-paying parties, who may experience malign 
effects from such arrangements but have no forum to give voice to their concerns (Reiner, 
2010). Rendering market-based policing responsive to and considerate of the wider public 
interest thus presents a significant policy challenge, particularly if both the authoriser and the 
provider are private sector bodies. 
 This is not to say, however, that there have been no attempts to bring public 
accountability to plural forms of policing. Whilst the institutional mechanisms of police 
accountability pay little attention to non-state policing providers, recent legal and policy 
developments in England and Wales have attempted to address this gap. The main mechanism 
of external accountability introduced has been in the form of systems of regulation of the 
private security industry. The Private Security Industry Act 2001 established the Security 
Industry Authority (SIA) to license those working in particular sectors of the industry, 
including static guards, door supervisors, wheel-clampers, bodyguards, private investigators 
and security consultants. Employment in these sectors requires a licence, which is contingent 
on both training and criminal records vetting. The Act makes it an offence to work without a 
licence or to employ someone without a licence. Breaching various conditions, including 
gaining a conviction prescribed as relevant, can lead to licence revocation. Although the Act 
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did not introduce mandatory licensing for security companies, it did establish a voluntary 
scheme to which they can submit themselves. 
 The licensing regime has, however, attracted a significant amount of criticism. For 
some its scope is too narrow, excluding significant sectors of the security industry such as 
security systems installers and in-house guards (White, 2010). Others have argued that the 
voluntary licensing of companies amounts to little more than an ineffective self-regulatory 
model (Button, 2002). Moreover, the narrow scope of the regulation signifies its failure to 
recognise the role of multi-lateral networks in policing, and ± perhaps as a consequence ± it 
has largely failed to improve relations between public police and private security firms, which 
remain widely plagued by mutual distrust trust and antipathy (White and Smith, 2009). 
According to plans of the Coalition Government, however, the regulation of private security is 
set to change to a more self-UHJXODWRU\ µEXVLQHVV OLFHQVLQJ¶ UHJLPH in which the focus of 
control will shift from licensing individuals to the licensing of private security firms. Under 
the proposed reforms, WKH VWDWH ZLOO DGRSW D PRUH µDUPV OHQJWK¶ DSSURDFK ZLWK companies 
handed responsibility for ensuring that required checks on individual employees are carried 
out. Although it remains to be seen what impact these changes will have on the private 
security industry (see White, this collection), it seems apparent that the regulation will 
continue to focus primarily on protecting members of the public rather than safeguarding 
broader notions of the public good (Stenning, 2009). 
 The narrow focus of the SIA licensing regime can be contrasted with µ&RPPXQLWy 
Safety Accreditation 6FKHPHV¶ which were introduced by the Police Reform Act 2002. The 
Act gives Chief Constables authority to accredit neighbourhood wardens, private security 
guards and other µnon-police¶ actors who meet a prescribed standard of professionalism, for 
example, in training and vetting arrangements. In so doing, accreditation schemes aspire to 
foster techniquHVRIµDUP¶VOHQJWK¶JRYHUQDQFHRIIHULQJthe police a potential means for 
harnessing and steering the community safety efforts of those deemed to be µSROLFHFRPSOLDQW¶
(Blair, 2002). Furthermore, in choosing who and who not to bestow accreditation upon, the 
police may be able to influence market demand for specific security providers. This, however, 
raises the spectre of the police ± in effect ± regulating those they compete with in the market 
place (Loader, 2000; Crawford et al., 2005). In practice, however, accreditation has not gained 
widespread support from either the police or the private security sector. As Crawford (2013) 
notes, the market benefits to be accrued from gaining accreditation status do not appear to 
outweigh the costs of securing this status. By the end of 2010, across 26 participating forces, 
there were 2,219 accredited persons (ACPO, 2011), most of who were local authority 
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employed wardens and anti-social behaviour enforcement officers. Consequently attempts to 
establish holistic oversight mechanisms over plural policing networks have been few and 
entirely limited to highly localised, short-lived efforts by police and community safety 
partners. 
 Despite the introduction of these legal and policy responses to the growth of plural 
policing in England and Wales, their impact on the function and orientation of local policing 
systems is narrow and appears, at best, to be limited. In the following section we offer a set of 
democratic principles, which serve as a means for thinking about the challenges of governing 
plural policing networks in ways that ensure their arrangement and provision advance 
democratic values. In so doing, we draw on a range of debates to identify the normative 
prospects and governance challenges of aligning plural policing to these democratic criteria. 
 
Plural policing and democratic values 
 
PrevioXVZRUNLQYROYLQJRQHRIWKHDXWKRUVLGHQWLILHGDQXPEHURIµGHPRFUDWLFFULWHULD¶DJDLQVW
which governance and accountability mechanisms for policing can be assessed (Jones et al., 
1996). This work suggested that a combination of themes or values can be associated with 
democratic arrangements, and that distinct policing systems place a different order of priority 
on these. The criteria identified were: equity, delivery of service, responsiveness, distribution 
of power, information, redress, and participation.  
 
Equity 
 
Perhaps the greatest democratic challenge for plural policing concerns equity, the idea that 
resources should be distributed fairly between groups and individuals such that the benefits (or 
harms) to be derived are spread equitably. Debates here must be seen in the context of 
pluralization under market-auspices, as described above. As problems of crime and disorder 
tend to cluster in places that are socially and economically marginalised, free market 
allocations of policing are likely to skew resources towards those communities of least need. 
The burden of harm on disadvantaged areas will be further increased if territorially defined 
policing merely displaces rather than prevents local problems. Although the benefits of 
policing may bleed into neighbouring areas, commercialised policing, by definition, privileges 
the narrow and partisan interests of its paymasters (Crawford and Lister, 2006). As such, 
accountability to market-based contracts promotes exclusion and social selectivity. 
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Furthermore, if those turning to commercial policing refuse to pay twice, through both 
taxation and fee-based arrangements, and withdraw their financial and political support for 
state policing, then those unable to turn to the market may experience a qualitative and 
quantitative poorer service (Bayley and Shearing, 1996). 
 On this view, then, much pluralized provision threatens to exacerbate unequal 
provision of policing services, in terms of both over-coercion and under-protection of 
disadvantaged groups. The increasingly fragmented policing landscape has clear exclusionary 
and polarizing tendencies. Whilst the rich are increasingly protected within commercially-
JRYHUQHGDQGVDIHµSULYDWH¶VSDFHVWKHKDYH-nots are left to fend for themselves in 
increasingly dangerous µSXEOLF¶VSDFHVSROLFHGE\DQLQFUHDVLQJO\DGYHUVDULDOSXEOLFSROLFH
force (Minton, 2012). This is not to deny, however, that state policing in Britain also has a 
problematic history in terms of equity. Even in those spaces that remain unconditionally 
µpublic¶DQGRSHQDFFHVV, security and policing provision is increasingly following the 
exclusionary and risk-based policies privileged by private forms of government. The spread of 
crime prevention by environmental design, as well as the exclusionary use of µDQWL-social 
EHKDYLRXURUGHUV¶DQGRWKHUVXFKanticipatory interventions (e.g. dispersal orders, youth 
curfews), are serving to privatize public space by public means (Crawford, 2011; Minton, 
2012µ%DQLVKPHQW¶as 9DQ6ZDDQLQJHQQRWHVµLVWhe new metaphor of this 
politics of public safety and the fears of law-DELGLQJFLWL]HQVDUHWKHGULYLQJIRUFHEHKLQGLW¶
On the other hand, it has been argued that, in any case, the public police organization is 
predicated upon universalist egalitarian principles, even if they have repeatedly failed to live 
up to such principles (Zedner, 2006). Above all, the public police are supposed to deliver 
HTXDOSROLFLQJVHUYLFHVWRDOOFLWL]HQVµZLWKRXWIHDURU IDYRXU¶.  
 Whilst this normative conception of public policing draws sharp contrast with private 
government, it has been nonetheless argued that the pluralization and marketization of policing 
may offer ground-breaking possibilities for a more democratic and just distribution of security 
services. Over a decade ago, Bayley and Shearing (1996) argued that publically-funded 
µYRXFKHUVFKHPHV¶RUµEORFNJUDQWV¶could enable especially underprivileged communities to 
participate in security markets. Enhancing access to security in this way, the argument runs, 
would address the distributional inequalities raised by the growth of commercial policing, but 
also serve the interests of these communities more directly than has been the case under state-
organized policing arrangements. This example of local governance can be seen as an 
experiment in which allowing citizens to self-organise their policing may lead to a more 
equitable and fairer deliverance of security (Wood and Shearing, 2007). Whilst this argument 
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offers a potential means for addressing a key democratic challenge of policing under pluralised 
conditions, greater engagement with, and the subsequent expansion of, the market may have 
far reaching consequences. Security goods have a self-fulfilling and expansionist logic, as the 
more they are actively pursued the more they may not only fuel further public anxieties, but 
also heighten unrealistic public expectations about WKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKµSROLFLQJ¶DORQHFDQ
deliver harmonious forms of social order (Crawford and Lister, 2006; Jones, 2012; Zedner, 
2009). If security begets security, then broader and deeper engagement with market forces 
raises pressing and inter-linked questions of sustainability and desirability. 
 
Service delivery 
 
Several authors have argued that plural policing heralds the possibility of improvements in the 
efficiency and effectiveness of service delivery. For example, Bayley and Shearing (1996, 
2001) have suggested that the numerical expansion of policing agents due to the proliferation 
of providers would enhance aggregate levels of security in society. In addition, the distinctive 
nature of private policing ± in terms of its innovative, embedded, consensual and risk-oriented 
preventive approaches ± has been contrasted favourably with the slow-moving, bureaucratic 
and punishment-oriented approach of the public police (Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Wood 
and Shearing, 2007). 7KHDVVXPSWLRQSRVLWHGKHUHLVWKDWWKHSULYLOHJLQJRIµVHFXULW\¶ZLWKLQ
the mentalities of private security lends itself to problem-focused approaches, which in turn 
provide greater levels of safety for local communities (Bayley and Shearing, 1996). In a 
related argument, it might be suggested that the competitive dynamic engendered by plural 
policing, in which providers compete in the market, helps to encourage value for money, 
innovation and efficiency. $QH[HPSODURIWKLVDUJXPHQWLVWKHDIRUHPHQWLRQHGµSROLFH
FRPPXQLW\VXSSRUWRIILFHU¶3&62WKHLQWURGXFWLRQRIZKLFKled to substantive increases in 
police visibility within local neighbourhoods (see Crawford et al., 2005). 
 Against this, however, the fragmentation and multiplication of policing providers can 
generate inefficiencies. As policing is increasingly market-arranged, attempts to coordinate 
activities and construct mutually beneficial alliances between different providers may be 
undermined by the pursuit of market advantage (Jones and Newburn, 1998; Noaks, 2000). The 
research of Crawford et al. (2005) in northern England, for instance, found strong evidence of 
µPDUNHWIDLOXUH¶LQWKHSURYLVLRQRIORFDOSDWUROVHUYLFes. Local efforts to tackle crime and 
disorder were undermined by a lack of cooperation and information sharing between policing 
agencies. Furthermore, these researchers reported that well-developed, joined-up working 
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practices between different providers were relatively rare and relations between them were 
often highly varied. Where local police did seek to establish partnership relations, their efforts 
were at times hampered by the sheer number and diversity of local providers. They also found 
that partnership relations were stymied by different working cultures, mentalities and 
practices, as well as by deep-rooted structural obstacles, both at operational and strategic 
levels. Municipal policing actors, for example, reported being fearful of jeopardising their 
good relations with local residents if they were perceived to be working too closely with the 
police. The resulting coordination deficits hampered attempts to ensure an effective response 
to local problems of security and order. 
 A further way in which plural policing may reduce effective service delivery arises 
from its concentration in local neighbourhoods DWWKHUHODWLYHO\µVRIW¶HQGRISROLFLQJfunctions 
HJµUHDVVXUDQFH¶µFRPPXQLW\ZRUN¶DQGµVRFLDOVHUYLFH¶DFWLYLWLHV. Given this focus, an 
effect of pluralization may be to free up police officers to focus on more serious incidents of 
crime and disorder. In so doing, however, it may reduce WKHDPRXQWRIµQRQ-DGYHUVDULDO¶
contact that police officers have with the wider public (Crawford and Lister, 2006). If 
µFRPPXQLW\SROLFLQJ¶is entirely devolved to state and non-state policing auxiliaries, then the 
police ULVNEHFRPLQJDµUHVLGXDOLVHG¶VHUYLFHfocused mostly upon law enforcement and 
aggressive intervention in situations of conflict. The possible negative implications for notions 
RIµSROLFLQJE\FRQVHQW¶FRXOGKDYHVHULRXVUDPLILFDWLRQVIRUWKHHIIHFWLYHQHVVRIWKH
organisation along a range of performance dimensions. If the police lack legitimacy in the eyes 
of the public, then citizens are less likely to pass on crime and disorder related information, 
co-operate as witnesses, respond positively to requests for assistance from police officers, and 
comply with police directives2QWKLVYLHZµGHPRFUDWLFDOO\DFFRXQWDEOH¶SROLFLQJLVQRWMXVW
morally desirable, but is instrumentally superior to µunaccountable¶ policing. 
 
Responsiveness 
 
The extent to which policing is responsive to local publics has become viewed, at a policy 
level at least, as increasingly important, reinforcing the idea that democratic policing ought to 
reflect the wishes of the people it serves (Manning, 2011). To this end, successive recent 
governments have attempted to increase police engagement and consultation with local 
communities, as demonstrated by the advent of the mutually reinforcing µFLWL]HQ-focused¶DQG
µneighbourhood¶ policing agendas (Home Office, 2010). The difficulties of ensuring that 
police engage in dialogue with and respond meaningfully to the wants and needs of local 
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communities are, however, historical and arguably deeply entrenched (Keith, 1988; Jones and 
Newburn, 2001). As police governance in England and Wales became more and more 
centralised, particularly over the last three decades, so police forces became increasingly 
responsive to the bureaucratic and political imperatives of the Home Office, at the expense of 
local communities (McLaughlin, 2005). Although the recent introduction of elected Police and 
Crime Commissioners (PCCs), designed to be democratic advocates for local communities, 
aimed to reverse this trend by ensuring the police do respond to community concerns, there 
remain significant structural and cultural obstacles to overcome if this is to be achieved in a 
fair and meaningfully way (see Reiner, Raine, this collection). 
 Against this, local private and community-organized forms of security provision may 
not only be more responsive to community concerns, but also able to draw more effectively 
upon local capacities and knowledge when compared to the top-down hierarchical 
bureaucracies that have traditionally characterized public policing (Bayley and Shearing, 
1996). The legal role of contracts within accountability arrangements governing commercial 
policing gives opportunity for those paying to articulate and VSHFLI\DFOHDUVHWRIµVHUYLFH
expecWDWLRQV¶WRZKLFKSURYLGHUVPXVWDWWHQG:KHUHSROLFLQJLVSXUFKDVHGfrom a private 
security firm by a public body (e.g. the local authority) on behalf of its constituents, again 
market logics suggest the provider will make some attempt to demonstrate value for money by 
responding to the needs of beneficiaries. Critics, however, stress that local and multiple 
publics seldom speak with a consensus and, moreover, LWLVRSHQIRUGHEDWHZKHWKHUZKDWµWKH
SXEOLF¶ZDQWV of local policing is always desirable (Johnston, 1992). Although security is often 
promoted as a universal and democratic good for the benefit of all, in fact its pursuit runs the 
risk of fostering intolerance and aggravating social exclusion if a community wishes to seek 
isolation and seclusion (Zedner, 2009). It would be very undemocratic for police and policing 
professionals to adopt such a segregating, and perhaps discriminatory, policy. 
 
Power distribution 
 
According to this democratic ideal, power to influence and review policing policy should not 
be concentrated in too few hands, but should be distributed across a number of institutions and 
agencies. The intention here is to negate conflicts between different constituents within any 
given social formation, and ensure stable compromises such that scarce policing resources can 
be allocated in ways that serve the interests of all constituents (Jones et al., 1996). Plural 
policing arguably scores highly on this democratic criterion. Rather than concentrating power 
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in the hands of a single, centralized state bureaucracy, by definition it involves a range of 
alternative providers and authorizers. As suggested above, local authorities that are dissatisfied 
with public policing provision in their area of jurisdiction, for example, can organize and 
direct their own municipal auxiliary patrols, either by employing community warden type 
providers, or by contracting-out the service to commercial security companies. Markets imply 
choice, and efficient markets presuppose the presence of suitable, alternative providers. 
 Against this, however, we should not ignore the structuring tendencies of security 
markets to accumulate power and market share within the auspices of a handful of institutions. 
The corporate take-overs and mergers that characterize the development of the domestic and 
global private security industry have resulted in market domination by a few very large 
companies (Johnston, 2007; White, 2010). If the oligopoly conditions found within the private 
sector provision of criminal justice services are repeated in the domain of security and 
policing, then the resulting concentration of power is likely to be to the detriment of 
democratic accountability. Moreover, despite the appearance that power may be distributed 
more locally, unregulated cooperation and information-sharing by plural policing bodies may 
UHVXOWLQµSROLFLQJEH\RQGWKHSROLFH¶XOWLPDWHO\IRUPLQJDIRUPLGDEOHDQGVLQLVWHUµUHVHUYH
DUVHQDO¶RIVRFLDOFRQWUROIRUWKHVWDWH&RKHQ, 1985). Although ± as described above ± the 
empirical evidence suggests that disorganization and lack of coordination are, in fact, the norm 
in pluralized security networks (Crawford et al., 2005; Terpstra, 2013), from a democratic 
viewpoint, it is vital to recognize the potential for abuse. Simultaneously, where plural forms 
of policing are arranged and delivered wholly under private auspices then the distribution of 
power is highly skewed towards serving the specific and parochial interests of those paying for 
its provision. 
 
Information 
 
The provision of a good level of information is a requirement for democratic accountability, 
enabling the authorities and the public to be informed about local policing. Securing this 
objective is potentially problematic in diversified policing networks, not least because 
fundamental information, such as who is authorising policing and who is providing it, may be 
unclear. In this, the multifaceted structures of relationships between public and private 
policing bodies blur the boundaries of responsibilities between them, which, in turn, can 
hamper the transparency of arrangements (Mashaw, 2006). Such amorphous, hybrid 
arrangements can also generate accountability deficits by obscuring not only µZKRLV
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responsible to whom and IRUZKDW¶5KRGHVEXWDOVRKRZa specific policing 
arrangement is organised and whose interests it serves. In this context, the average citizen in 
any British urban area might find themselves moving through areas that are policed by an 
array of public and private actors wearing a range of official police-type uniforms, but have 
little sense of the different interest groups represented. In their study of plural policing patrols, 
Crawford et al. (2005) highlight how, within this context, the blurring of roles, 
responsibilities, powers and identities, both of and between, plural policing personnel can 
foster public confusion and create uncertainties over what the public might expect of different 
providers. Such concerns are by no means baseless. The activities of the public police have 
traditionally been primarily focused upon unambiguously public spaces. Hence residential 
streets, public parks and open spaces, public roads and motorways etc have formed their 
primary spatial locus. But, as mentioned above, sizeable tracts of commercially-developed 
land, traditionally seen DVµSXEOLF¶ spaces and therefore subject to public forms of authority, 
are now increasingly leased to and controlled by private, corporate interests (Crawford, 2011). 
It would be unsurprising if such developments did not generate uncertainty among some 
citizens, unsure of the legitimate authority of those private guards policing such areas. If this 
holds true, then the growing spatial complexity of land patterns, and the knowledge deficits 
that may arise, are likely to harbour problematic implications for democratic notions of 
policing. 
 
Redress 
 
How the malpractice of individual policing agents is dealt with is a key question in any system 
of accountability. Where an individual has been wronged then there should be access to a 
formal and external procedure to ensure that grievance is investigated and acted on 
accordingly. The importance of this principle is reflected, both at a rhetorical and practical 
level, by police officers being held accountable to the criminal law for their actions when on 
duty. Whilst formal complaints mechanisms are now an established part of the police 
accountability framework in England and Wales, these have yet to develop comprehensively 
in the field of plural policing. For example, there are no such procedures of redress for private 
and volunteer-based forms of plural policing, raising concerns of unaccountable vigilante 
groups (Johnston, 1992). Although the licensing procedures discussed above, introduced for 
contracted private security actors, do offer a means for redress where required standards of 
conduct have been breached, their effectiveness, for instance, to remove rogue elements from 
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the industry by refusing or revoking licences is limited (White and Smith, 2009). Indeed, there 
is some evidence to show that citizens do not readily complain to external bodies about the 
conduct of private security actors when the circumstances indicate they have strong grounds to 
do so (Lister et al., 2000). Furthermore, the types of surveillance and order-maintenance that 
have arisen within many of the quasi-public spaces policed by private actors may herald a 
more invasive approach to citizen privacy than traditionally apply in other spatial contexts. 
Contracted private security guards derive considerable de facto legal powers from property 
law, which allows them to exclude people or subject visitors to random searches of their 
possessions before entering premises such as football stadia, discotheques and airport 
terminals. A key concern of critics here is the absence of formal restrictions on the exercise of 
this private authority coupled with the limited nature of the external accountability relations 
that govern its use (Reiner, 2010). Institutional mechanisms of democratic accountability have 
not kept pace with these trends, leading to debates about exacHUEDWLQJµGHPRFUDWLFGHILFLWV¶ 
 Whilst these observations suggest the public police meet this criteria more than other 
sectors of policing, significantly the police complaints system has been dogged by perceptions 
of inefficiency anGLQHIIHFWLYHQHVVUHVXOWLQJLQDVXFFHVVLRQRIµIDLOHG¶ZDWFKGRJERGLHV
(Smith, 2006). Further, notwithstanding the recent infusion of private sector management 
principles within the public police, in all but fairly serious incidents of misconduct it remains 
bureaucratically and legally complex to remove or dismiss a police officer for wrong-doing. 
By contrast, it can be argued that market disciplines pressurize commercial policing bodies to 
be more responsive in this regard than existing state arrangements. For example, an inefficient 
or ineffective security company can expect to lose its contract with the purchaser, and 
individual security officers who under-perform or misbehave can expect to be sacked. In this 
respect lay narratives of policing, which commonly draw a sharp distinction between 
µDFFRXQWDEOH¶public SROLFHRIILFHUVDQGµXQDFFRXQWDEOH¶SULYDWHVHFXULW\guards, tend to be 
overstated. 
 
Participation 
 
Various authors have argued that plural policing can provide great opportunity for community 
participation in the organization and delivery of security. In particular, Shearing and 
colleagues have described innovative forms of community self-governance in less advantaged 
communities suFKDVWKHµSHDFHFRPPLWWHHV¶RI Zwelethemba in South Africa (Wood and 
Shearing, 2007). A fundamental advantage claimed for such arrangements is that they closely 
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reflect the requirements of local people, and involve them in deliberative decision-making 
about potential solutions to security (and other) problems. This argument stems from the 
recognition that contractually governed forms of policing have a µFOLHQW-GHILQHG¶PDQGDWH: 
they purposefully serve first, foremost and arguably exclusively, the interests of the paying 
customer. This, however, is something of a double-edged sword. Whilst it may enable 
µFRQVXPHUV¶of policing to have their voices heard, equally it risks the likelihood of an 
accountability deficit for those non-participants who may nonetheless experience negative 
consequences of the arrangement. Crawford and Lister (2006) found such evidence in their 
study of a privately paid, public policing initiative in northern England. They reported how 
residents in an adjacent area to this initiative felt that they had suffered a loss of policing as a 
result of the police being contractually bound to provide an additional level of resources to the 
area covered by the contract. Furthermore, theVHµQRQ-SDUWLFLSDWLQJ¶UHVLGHQWV also perceived 
that crime and disorder had been displaced into their village as a result of the greater policing 
presence LQWKHLUQHLJKERXUV¶DUHD. As such, beneficiaries of commercial policing tend to be a 
narrowly constructed group, which may generate tensions with those who are excluded 
(Loader, 2000; Zedner, 2009). 
 
Responding to the democratic governance challenge of plural policing 
 
The pluralised nature of contemporary policing brings both challenges and opportunities for 
democratic governance. From the above discussion, it offers some potential opportunities for 
enhancing the democratic content of security governance. For example, community forms of 
VHFXULW\JRYHUQDQFHµIURPEHORZ¶PD\H[WHQGSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQRIORFDO
policing and render its impacts more equitable, market choice may provide real alternatives in 
cases of ineffective or unjust policing, and contractual forms of market regulation may offer a 
much more direct form of accountability than traditional institutional mechanisms are able to 
deliver. However, at the same time pluralization raises particular concerns of inequitable 
distribution of policing, potential confusion about the functions and legal powers of different 
policing bodies, and threats to effective service delivery due to lack of coordination and 
duplication of functions. The central challenge, however, concerns the fact that there are no 
institutional mechanisms for rendering local patchworks of security governance responsive to 
democratic direction and oversight.  
Structures of governance and accountability within the web of policing ± mirroring 
formations of policing ± are dispersed, fragmented and splintered. Hence, institutionalised 
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practices of account giving are mostly compartmentalised, segmented and bureaucratically 
aligned (Crawford and Lister, 2006).2 Moreover, many of the accountability relations within 
these networks DUHQRWµSXEOLF¶LQWKDWWKH\DUHQHLWKHUWUDQVSDUHQWWRWKHSXEOLFQRUinvolve 
µSXEOLF¶VHFWRUERGLHVIndeed, the contracts governing commercially-arranged policing 
initiatives are frequently subject to commercial confidentiality clauses, shrouding normative 
assessments of their compatibility with the public interest. It is therefore important to 
underline the need to establish holistic mechanisms of oversight and accountability, which 
connect policing networks with democratic structures. Democratically accountable policing 
VKRXOGEHµFRQJUXHQWZLWKWKHYDOXHVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\LQZKLFKLWZRUNVDQGUHVSRQVLYHWR
WKHGLVFUHSDQFLHVZKHQWKH\DUHSRLQWHGRXW¶%D\OH\, 1983: 146). Not only must we develop 
ways of subjecting policing authorisers and providers other than the state and public police to 
UHJXODWLRQDQGFRQWUROEXWLQDGGLWLRQµSOXUDOSROLFLQJKDVWREHDVVHVVHGDVDZKROHLQWHUPV
RILWVFRPSOH[O\LQWHUFRQQHFWHGSUDFWLFHDQGLPSDFW¶:DONHU, 2000: 280). Yet, as different 
providers within policing networks tend to be subject to different regulatory regimes, there is 
QRVLQJOHSRLQWRIJRYHUQDQFHRIWKHQHWZRUNV¶YDULRXVQRGHV$VDFRQVHTXHQFHWKHUHLVQR
RYHUVLJKWPHFKDQLVPIRUWKHWRWDOLW\RIµQRGDOSROLFLQJ¶LQDQ\JLYen locale. This is not to 
argue that plural policing networks are completely unaccountable and unregulated: elements of 
such networks clearly do operate with varying degrees of accountability to different audiences. 
It remains the case, however, that under current institutional arrangements in England and 
Wales there are no formal mechanisms for rendering plural policing networks as a whole 
accountable to democratic values.  
 One possible way forward, and one that acknowledges the changed landscape of 
contemporary security governance whilst reasserting the notion of security as a public good, 
has been put forward by Loader (2000). He suggests the establishment of significant new 
accountability institutions ± Policing Commissions ± to take responsibility for coordinating 
and monitoring the range of bodies involved in policing and security provision at the local, 
regional and national levels. Such Commissions would be democratically driven and inclusive, 
with part of the membership being directly elected, but the other part appointed to ensure 
adequate representation from a range of social groups. The proposed Policing Commissions 
would have a formidable range of powers and functions, including the role formulating and 
co-ordinating policy, licensing security providers, subsidizing extra provision in under-
serviced areas, and the monitoring and evaluation of standards. They would have a statutory 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\WRHQVXUHWKDWDOOFLWL]HQVUHFHLYHDµIDLU¶VKDUHRISROLFLQJVHUYLFHVZKLFKZRXOG
require attention both to over-policing and under-protection of particular social groups.  
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 These proposals appear to offer an imaginative way forward for promoting the 
effective involvement of local community knowledge and capacities in security governance. 
They also offer the possibility of public, democratic fora that can provide more effective 
coordination of the complex networks of security governance. In so doing, they could promote 
more equitable provision that balances the demands of security against those of other valued 
social goods. The proposals have been supported by Crawford et al. (2005) following their 
empirical study of plural policing in various parts of England and Wales. They argue it is at 
the regional level that such Commissions might have most impact. Operating at this scale, 
Commissions could not only balance the competing pressures of local and national interests so 
evident in the push and pull of policing policy, but also provide oversight of the diverse range 
of policing and community safety agencies operating across local authority and current police 
force boundaries. In addition, it would align better with any shift towards regional police 
forces, whilst closely mapping the jurisdiction of Commissions to the regional bases of the 
corporate private security industry. 
 Alternatively, and in the absence of any new institutional architecture, such as policing 
commissions described above, it might be plausible to hand responsibility for regulating local 
plural policing networks to elected Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) (Crawford, 
2013), a powerful democratic institution operating at local and regional levels. There is a logic 
to this suggestion, not least as PCCs already have responsibility for the oversight and 
accountability of µpolicing by the police¶, and moreover are required by law to work with local 
community safety partners to produce holistic and coordinated responses to crime and 
disorder. This option, however, raises both normative and practical concerns. 
 First, serious doubts remain about the design of this model of governance (Jones et al., 
2012). By definition PCCs are µ3ROLFH¶FRPPLVVLRQHUVQRWµ3ROLFLQJ¶FRPPLVVLRQHUVLoader, 
2013; Crawford, 2013), suggesting a narrow focus to the role that is reinforced by the relevant 
legislation GHILQLQJWKHµWRWDOLW\¶RIORFDOSROLFLQJIRUZKLFK they have responsibility solely in 
terms of those resources controlled by the Chief Constable (Lister and Rowe, 2015). Whilst 
legislative reform could address this conceptual shortcoming, the wind of political pressure to 
expand the role of PCCs is blowing forcefully towards it subsuming responsibility for other 
criminal justice institutions and emergency services rather than regulating non-police 
providers of policing (Home Office, 2010; May, 2013). Second, there remains a broader 
concern that PCCs stand outside the established local system of public service administration. 
This is likely to restrict the capacity of PCCs to engage and influence the range of public 
policy domains (e.g. housing, education, youth services, health, etc) under the auspices of 
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which plural policing initiatives are arranged and delivered. As a consequence, to be effective, 
PCCs would need to overcome significant administrative and organisational barriers were they 
to gain this responsibility. Third, as PCCS are µFRPPLVVLRQHUV¶RIpolicing services it follows 
that they ought not to be tasked with regulating the market within which they are significant 
participants. Just as Loader (2000) suggests the police ± as providers of policing services ± 
should not be given responsibility for rendering accountable other providers within the 
network, so it is normatively unsustainable for a purchaser within the marketplace to have this 
over-arching responsibility. Indeed, as we have stressed throughout this chapter, purchaser / 
provider accountability arrangements tend to be narrow, insular and structured to serve 
parochial interests less so commonplace, public interests. As such, in our view, any new 
institutional architecture designed to regulate marketised networks of policing ought to have 
administrative separation from the market and its participants. Fourth, such an option would 
reflect a wholly state-centric model of regulation, which acting alone may be unable to address 
the fundamental prREOHPRIDVVHUWLQJGHPRFUDWLFOHYHUDJHRYHUµSULYDWHJRYHUQPHQW¶$Vopen 
µSXEOLFVSDFHV¶DUHLQFUHDVLQJO\ORFDWHGZLWKLQ privately-owned or managed land, and legal 
rulings during the past decade or so have confirmed the power of corporations to organise and 
undertake security provision themselves, then making them responsive to or compliant with 
democratic principles may be an uphill struggle. In short, PCCs have no more legal authority 
over the operation of private policing in mass private property than did local police authorities 
and chief constables under the former system of police governance. For this reason, and 
following Stenning (2009), it seems logical to suggest that any regulatory framework for 
policing ought to comprise a plurality of organizational modes. Bringing together multi-lateral 
representation from different sectors would also address the age old concern that the 
governance of policing should not be rendered accountable WRDQGWKXVULVNEHLQJµFDSWXUHG¶
by, any one single locus of democratic, political authority (Lustgarten, 1986). 
Despite the challenges and opportunities brought by the pluralization and 
marketization of policing, concerns over the absence of any external regulator of market-led 
policing networks remain largely confined to the academy. Yet the need for such institutional 
innovation is likely to become more pressing with the continued impact of austerity policies 
on the further fragmentation of policing. Sizeable cuts to police budgets have already led to 
substantial reductions in the numbers of police officers and PCSOs, and government ministers 
have indicated that further expenditure reductions will be imposed on public police forces 
should they be returned to office at the next General Election. At the same time, austerity 
policies have reduced the capacity of the local state to fund the purchase of commercial and 
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municipal forms of visible patrol. Partly as a result of these developments, policing forms 
µEHORZJRYHUQPHQW¶(in the form of provision by voluntary, community and faith-based 
groups) appear to have been increasing both in scale and diversity (Jones and Lister 2015). 
The accountability challenges raised by pluralization are thus likely to become more rather 
than less daunting in future years.   
 
Conclusions  
 
The growth of multi-lateral, local security networks reflects the shifting nature of 
responsibility for policing and community safety between the market, civil society and the 
state. Their proliferation raises a number of conceptual, empirical and normative questions that 
have far-reaching implications security governance. As we have suggested, they give rise to a 
series of whaWZHPLJKWWHUPµFRQVWLWXWLRQDO LVVXHV¶ over how we can govern these networks in 
ways that ensure they function in ways that accord with democratic principles. To this end, our 
primary aim in this chapter has been to steer debates towards the challenges of aligning the 
order of plural policing to a set of democratic criteria. In so doing, we have drawn caution to 
the role of the market in ordering the patterns and practices of plural policing. This is not to 
argue that plural policing cannot deliver socially desirable goals, such as improved security for 
local neighbourhoods, but rather, we suggest, an unregulated market for policing services may 
be counter-productive to securing social justice. As we have described, this is an area within 
policing scholarship which is beginning to emerge from the long shadow cast by the state 
provision of policing and security; it is also one that has given rise to rich theoretical and 
practical debate. On one view, for example, the growth of plural policing networks provides 
the possibilities for a more just and accountable provision of security (Johnston and Shearing, 
2003; Wood and Shearing, 2007). On the other hand, the proliferation of policing authorizers 
and providers raises concerns amongst other authors, not least in terms of the potential for 
exacerbating social exclusion and polarization (Crawford and Lister, 2006; Reiner, 2010; 
Jones, 2012). Within these debates, however, there is consensus for plural policing networks to 
be subjected to democratic processes of regulation in order to ensure their arrangement and 
provision attends to the public good. As Stenning has argued, how this is to be achieved in 
terms of designing suitable institutional architecture will require not only sophisticated 
theoretical modelling, but also persuasive and impactful arguments that are able to mobilise 
the necessary political resources behind the cause.  
  
- 22- 
 
References 
 
Association of Chief Police Officers (2011) A Survey of Employers Involved in the Community 
Safety Accreditation Scheme. London: ACPO. 
 
%DEHULV3µ7KH1HZ3XEOLF0DQDJHPHQWDQGD1HZ$FFRXQWDELOLW\¶Public 
Administration 76, 451-70. 
 
Bayley, Dµ$FFRXQWDELOLW\DQGFRQWURORIWKHSROLFHOHVVRQVIURP%ULWDLQLQ7
Bennett (ed.) The Future of Policing, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
%D\OH\'DQG6KHDULQJ&µ7KH)XWXUHRI3ROLFLQJ¶Law and Society Review 20(3): 
585-606. 
 
Bayley, D. and Shearing, C. (2001) The New Structure of Policing, Washington: National 
Institute of Justice. 
 
Blair, I. (2003) Leading Towards the FutureVSHHFKWRµ7KH)XWXUHRI3ROLFLQJ&RQIHUHQFH¶
10 October, London School of Economics 
 
Bovens, M. µ3XEOLF$FFRXQWDELOLW\¶LQE. Ferlie, L. E. Lynn and Pollitt (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Public Management, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.182-208. 
 
Brodeur, J. P. (2010) The Policing Web, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Button, M. (2002) Private Policing. Cullompton: Willan Publishing. 
 
Button, M. (2007) Security Officers and Policing, Aldershot: Ashgate. 
 
Cohen, S. (1985) Visions of Social Control, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Crawford, A. (2007) µReassurance 3ROLFLQJIHHOLQJLVEHOLHYLQJ¶, in A. Henry and D.J.  
Smith (eds) Transformations of Policing, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 143-68. 
 
- 23- 
 
&UDZIRUG$µ7KHSDWWHUQRISROLFLQJLQWKH8.SROLFLQJEH\RQGWKHSROLFHin 
Newburn, T. (ed.) The Handbook of Policing (2nd edn). Cullompton: Willan, pp.136-168. 
 
Crawford, A. (2011µ)URPWKH6KRSSLQJ0DOOWRWKH6WUHHW&RUQHU'\QDPLFVRI([FOXVLRQLQ
WKH*RYHUQDQFHRI3XEOLF6SDFH¶LQ$&UDZIRUGHGInternational and Comparative 
Criminal Justice and Urban Governance, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 483-
518. 
 
&UDZIRUG$µ7KHSROLFHSROLFLQJDQGWKHIXWXUHRIWKH³H[WHQGHGSROLFHIDPLO\´¶LQ-
Brown (ed) The Future of Policing, London: Routledge, pp. 173-190. 
 
Crawford, A. and Lister, S. (2004a) The extended policing family: Visible patrols in 
residential areas, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation 
 
Crawford, A. and Lister, S. (2004bµ7KH3DWFKZRUN6KDSHRI5HDVVXUDQFH3ROLFLQJLQ
England and Wales: Integrated Local Security Quilts or Frayed, Fragmented and Fragile 
7DQJOHG:HEV"¶ Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management. 
27(3): 413-430. 
 
&UDZIRUG$DQG/LVWHU6µ$GGLWLRQDO6HFXULW\3DWUROVLQ5HVLGHQWLDO$UHDV1RWHV
IURPWKH0DUNHWSODFH¶Policing and Society, 16(2):164-188. 
 
Crawford, A., Lister, S., Blackburn, S. and Burnett, J. (2005) Plural Policing: the mixed 
economy of visible security patrols, Bristol: Policy Press. 
 
Dupont, B. (2004µ6HFXULW\LQWKHDJHRIQHWZRUNV¶Policing and Society, 14:1: 76-91. 
 
Garland, D. (2001) The Culture of Control, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Greve, C. (2008) Contracting for Public Services, London: Routledge. 
 
Home Office (2001) Policing a New Century: A blueprint for reform. London: Home Office. 
 
Home Office, (2010) Policing in the 21st century: reconnecting police and the people. 
- 24- 
 
London: Home Office. 
 
Johnston, L. (1992) The Rebirth of Private Policing, London: Routledge. 
 
-RKQVWRQ/µ7UDQVQDWLRQDOVHFXULW\JRYHUQDQFH¶LQ-:RRGDQG%'XSRQWHGV 
Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 33-51. 
 
Johnston, L. and Shearing, C. (2003) Governing Security, London: Routledge. 
 
-RQHV7µ*RYHUQLQJVHFXULW\SOXUDOL]DWLRQSULYDWL]DWLRQDQGSROLDUL]DWLRQLQFULPH
control and policiQJ¶LQ00DJXLUH50RUJDQDQG55HLQHUHGVThe Oxford Handbook 
of Criminology (5th Edn) Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp.743-768. 
 
-RQHV7µ7KH$FFRXQWDELOLW\RI3ROLFLQJ¶LQT. Newburn (ed.) The Handbook of 
Policing (2nd edn). Cullompton: Willan, pp. 603-627. 
 
Jones, T. and Lister, S. µThe Policing of Public Space: Recent developments in Plural 
Policing in England and Wales¶European Journal of Policing Studies. 
 
Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (1997) Policing After the Act: Police Governance after the Police  
DQG0DJLVWUDWHV¶&RXUWV$FW, London: Policy Studies Institute. 
 
Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (1998) Private Security and Public Policing, Oxford: ClarendonPress. 
 
Jones, T. and Newburn, T. (2001) Widening access: improving police relations with hard to  
reach groups. Police Research Series Paper 138. London: Home Office. 
 
-RQHV71HZEXUQ7DQG6PLWK'-µ3ROLFLQJDQGWKH,GHDRI'HPRFUDF\¶British 
Journal of Criminology 36(2): 182-198. 
 
.HLWK0µ6TXDULQJthe circles? Consultation and inner-FLW\SROLFLQJ¶New 
community, 15 (1), 63±77. 
 
- 25- 
 
Lea, J. & Stenson, K. (2007) µSecurity, Sovereignty, and Non-State *RYHUQDQFHµ)URP 
%HORZ¶¶, Canadian Journal of Law and Society 22(2): 9-27. 
 
/LVWHU6µ3OXUDO3ROLcing, Local Communities and the PDUNHWLQYLVLEOHSDWUROV¶LQ 
Dearling, A, Newburn, T. and Somerville, P. (eds) Supporting Safe Communities: Housing,  
crime and communities, London: Chartered Institute of Housing, pp. 95-113. 
 
Lister, S., Hobbs, D., Hall, S. and Winlow, S. (2000) µViolence in the Night-Time Economy;  
Bouncers: The Reporting, Recording and Prosecution of Assaults¶, Policing and Society 10  
(4): 383-402. 
 
Lister, S. and Rowe, M. (2014) µElecting police and crime commissioners in England and  
Wales: prospecting for the democratisation of policing¶, Policing and Society, Online Access. 
 
/RDGHU,µ3OXUDO3ROLFLQJDQG'HPRFUDWLF*RYHUQDQFH¶Social and Legal Studies, 9: 
323-345. 
 
Lustgarten, L. (1986) The Governance of the Police, London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
 
Manning, P. (2011) Democratic Policing in a Changing World, Boulder: Paradigm. 
 
0DVKDZ-/µ$FFRXQWDELOLW\DQGLQVWLWXWLRQDOGHVLJQVRPHWKRXJKWVRQWKHJUDPPDU 
RIJRYHUQDQFH¶LQ0:'RZGOHHGPublic Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and 
Experiences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 115-157. 
 
May, T. (2013) Police and Crime Commissioners, one year on: warts and all. Speech to 
Policy Exchange, 7 November 2013. Available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/police-and-crime-commissioners-one-year-on-
warts-and-all Accessed 13/01/15. 
 
0F/DXJKOLQ(µ)RUFLQJWKH,VVXH1HZ/DERXU1HZ/RFDOLVm and the Democratic 
5HQHZDORI3ROLFH$FFRXQWDELOLW\¶The Howard Journal 44(5): 473±489. 
 
- 26- 
 
Minton, A. (2012) Ground Control: Fear and happiness in the twenty-first century city (2nd  
Edn), London: Penguin. 
 
0RUDQ0µ7KH5LVHRIWKH5HJXODWRU\6WDWHLQ%ULWDLQ¶3DUOLDPHQWDU\ Affairs 54(1): 
19±34. 
 
0XOJDQ5µ7KH3URFHVVRI3XEOLF$FFRXQWDELOLW\¶Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, 56(1): 25-36. 
 
NACRO (2003) Eyes and Ears: The Role of Neighbourhood Wardens, London: National 
Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders. 
 
1RDNV/µ3ULYDWH&RSVRQWKH%ORFND5HYLHZRIWKH5ROHRI3ULYDWH6HFXULW\LQ 
5HVLGHQWLDO&RPPXQLWLHV¶Policing and Society, 10(2): 143-161. 
 
Osborne, D. and T. Gaebler (1992) Reinventing Government: How the Entrepreneurial 
Spirit is Transforming the Public Sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
 
5HLQHU5µ&RXQWLQJWKH&RSSHUV$FFRXQWDELOLW\LQ3ROLFLQJ¶LQ36WHQQLQJ
Accountability for Criminal Justice, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp. 74-92. 
 
Reiner, R. (1993) µ3ROLFHDFFRXQWDELOLW\SULQFLSOHVSDWWHUQVDQGSUDFWLFHV¶LQ55HLQHUDQG
S. Spencer (eds) Accountable Policing: Effectiveness, Empowerment and Equality, London: 
Institute for Public Policy Research, pp. 1-23. 
 
Reiner, R. (2010) The Politics of the Police (4th edn), Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997) Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, 
Reflexivity, and Accountability, Milton Keynes: Open University Press. 
 
Rose, N. and Miller3µ3ROLWLFDO3RZHU%H\RQGWKH6WDWH3UREOHPDWLFVRI
*RYHUQPHQW¶British Journal of Sociology, 43(2): 173-205. 
 
- 27- 
 
Rigakos, G. (2002) The New Parapolice: Risk Markets and Commodified Social Control, 
Torono: University of Toronto Press. 
 
Rhodes, R. (1997) Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and 
Accountability, Buckingham: Open University Press. 
 
5RVH1µ*RYHUQPHQWDQG&RQWURO¶%ULWLVK-RXUQDORI&ULPLQRORJ\±39. 
 
Sarre, R. and Prenzler, T. (2005) The Law of Private Security in Australia, Sydney: Lawbook. 
 
6KHDULQJ&µ5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKH5HIXVDOWR$FNQRZOHGJH3ULYDWH*RYHUQPHQWV¶LQ- 
Wood and B. Dupont (eds) Democracy, Society and the Governance of Security, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp.11-32. 
 
6KHDULQJ&µ3XEOLFDQG3ULYDWH3ROLFLQJ¶LQ:6DXOVEXU\-0RWWDQG71HZEXUQ 
(eds) Themes in Contemporary Policing, Plymouth: Latimer Trend and Co, pp. 83-95.  
 
6KHDULQJ&DQG6WHQQLQJ3µ0RGHUQ3ULYDWH6HFXULW\,WV*URZWKDQG,PSOLFDWLRQV¶
Crime and Justice: An Annual Review of Research, 3, 193-245. 
 
Shearing, C. and Stenning, P. µ3ULYDWH6HFXULW\,PSOLFDWLRQVIRU6RFLDO&RQWURO¶ 
Social Problems, 30(5): 493-505. 
 
Singer, P. (2003) Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry, Cornell: 
Cornell University Press. 
 
Smith, G. (2006 µ$ 0RVW (QGXULQJ 3UREOHP 3ROLFH &RPSODLQWV 5HIRUP LQ (QJODQG DQG
Wales, Journal of Social Policy 35(1): 121-141. 
 
6WHQQLQJ3µ*RYHUQDQFHDQG$FFRXntability in a Plural Policing Environment ± the  
6WRU\6R)DU¶Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice, 3(1): 22-33. 
 
6WHQQLQJ3µ3RZHUVDQG$FFRXQWDELOLW\RI3ULYDWH3ROLFH¶European Journal on  
Criminal Policy and Research 8(3): 325-352. 
- 28- 
 
 
6WHQQLQJ3DQG6KHDULQJ&µ7KHTXLHWUHYROXWLRQ7KHQDWXUHGHYHORSPHQWDQG 
JHQHUDOOHJDOLPSOLFDWLRQVRISULYDWHSROLFLQJLQ&DQDGD¶Criminal Law Quarterly,  
22: 220-248. 
 
Terpstra, J., van Stokkom, B., and Spreeuwers, R. (2013) Who Patrols the Streets? The 
Hague: Eleven International Publishing. 
 
Trebilcock, M.J. and Iacobucci, E.M. (2003µ3ULYDWLVDWLRQDQG$FFRXQWDELOLW\¶Harvard Law  
Review, 116: 1422-53. 
 
Van Steden, R. (2007) Privatizing Policing: Describing and explaining the growth of private  
security, Amsterdam: BJU Publishers. 
 
Van Swaaningen, R. (2005) µPublic saIHW\ DQG WKH PDQDJHPHQW RI IHDU¶ Theoretical 
Criminology 9(3): 289-305. 
 
Wakefield, A. (2003) Selling Security: The Private Policing of Public Space, Cullompton,  
Devon: Willan Publishing. 
 
Walker, N. (2000) Policing in a Changing Constitutional Order, London: Sweet and Maxwell. 
 
White, A. (2010) The Politics of Private Security: Regulation, Reform and Re-Legitimation, 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmiillan. 
 
White, A. and Smith, M. (2009) The Security Industry Authority: A Baseline Review, 
University  
of Sheffield. At:  
http://www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/Documents/research/sia_baseline_review.pdf 
 
Wood, J. and Shearing, C. (2007) Imagining Security, Cullompton: Willan. 
 
Zedner, L. (2006) 'Policing before and after the Police: the historical antecedents of 
contemporary crime control' British Journal of Criminology 46(1):78-96. 
- 29- 
 
 
Zedner, L. (2009) Security, London: Routledge. 
 
                                                 
1
 The authors wish to acknowledge that this chapter has benefitted significantly from discussions with Ronald 
Van Stedden. 
2
 An important recent exception to this has been introduced by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing 
Act 2014. Section 135 of the Act extends the remit of the Independent Police Complaints Commission to private 
sector actors who are contracted by the police to provide services (e.g. detention officers). 
